Arming Militias in Gaza: A Repetition of Israel’s Past Errors?

Amid the ongoing war on the Gaza Strip, shocking revelations have emerged about a controversial Israeli strategy involving the arming of criminal gangs and families in the territory. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, wanted by the International Criminal Court on charges of war crimes, has acknowledged supporting these groups based on security recommendations, describing it as a “good thing” for protecting Israeli soldiers.

This admission, prompted by disclosures from Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, about the secret delivery of weapons to these gangs, raises critical questions about Israel’s motives and the repercussions of this policy on Gaza’s security and humanitarian situation. This article aims to analyze this strategy, its historical roots, the risks of its failure, and its devastating impact on the Palestinian social fabric.

Arming Gangs: An Israeli Strategy to Achieve Political and Military Goals

Lieberman revealed that Israel, under Netanyahu’s direct orders, supplied weapons to criminal gangs in Gaza without the approval of the Ministerial Security Cabinet (the Kabinet). The move aims to create an alternative force to the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), with these gangs, such as those led by Abu Shabah in eastern Rafah, acting as “field commanders” who assist in protecting Israeli soldiers by monitoring resistance movements and controlling the distribution of humanitarian aid. These gangs are concentrated in strategic areas like the Rafah and Kerem Abu Salem crossings, enabling them to control aid flows and resell them, thereby increasing their influence and attracting new collaborators.

Israeli occupation forces have equipped these gangs with weapons, armor, and uniforms marked with the Hebrew word “madrich” (guide) to facilitate their identification during field operations in dangerous “red zones.” However, the early exposure of this operation, driven by internal political disputes in Israel, highlights the fragility of coordination between security and political entities and raises doubts about the strategy’s effectiveness.

A History of Experimentation: From “Village of Spies” to Rafah Gangs

The roots of this strategy trace back to the 1970s, when Israel relocated collaborating families to the “Dahaniya” area in eastern Rafah after dismantling the Yamit settlement in Sinai. Later dubbed the “Village of Spies,” this area served as a haven for agents working with the occupation. Following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, these individuals were relocated to northern Negev. During the First Intifada, Palestinian resistance confronted these collaborators with killings or physical punishment to deter them. Today, this confrontation is echoed in the targeting of members of Yasser Abu Shabah’s gang by the Qassam Brigades, as documented in a video released in May 2025 showing attacks on “undercover” Israeli soldiers and Abu Shabah’s militia.

This historical repetition reflects the continuity of Israel’s approach to recruiting loyal forces but also underscores persistent Palestinian resistance aimed at thwarting such plans. The failure of the “Village of Spies” experiment in the past suggests that these new gangs may face a similar fate, particularly given the Palestinian society’s rejection of collaboration with the occupation.

Prospects of Failure: Societal Rejection and the Risk of Resistance Seizing Weapons

The chances of these gangs succeeding are slim due to the deep-rooted public rejection of collaboration with the Israeli occupation within Palestinian society. Palestinians view these groups as a betrayal of the national cause, leaving them without the essential social cover needed to sustain their presence. This societal rejection is not new; over decades, Gaza has witnessed fierce resistance to collaborators, whether through social ostracism or direct targeting by resistance factions. This reality places the armed gangs in a precarious position, as they rely almost entirely on Israeli protection, making them vulnerable to collapse once that support is withdrawn or clashes with the resistance escalate.

Moreover, there are significant risks associated with the weapons Israel provides to these gangs. Historical precedent shows that arms given to loyalist groups can end up in the hands of the resistance. For instance, after the 2006 events in Gaza, Hamas seized large quantities of weapons held by the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, bolstering its military capabilities. This scenario could repeat with gangs like those led by Yasser Abu Shabah, where resistance factions might capture these weapons after the prolonged war that has depleted their resources, thereby strengthening their capabilities rather than weakening them, contrary to Israel’s hopes.

Destroying the Social Fabric: The Role of Gangs in Exacerbating the Humanitarian Crisis

Beyond security risks, these gangs contribute to the destruction of Gaza’s Palestinian social fabric by sowing chaos and violence. By looting humanitarian aid and selling it on the black market, these groups exacerbate the suffering of residents living under a suffocating Israeli siege and famine that has claimed many lives, especially children. Their activities, such as theft, murder, and imposing control through force, create a state of insecurity among civilians, deepening social divisions and fueling internal conflicts.

This role aligns with the policies of Israel’s extremist government, which continues its siege on Gaza, starves its population, and imposes collective punishment. The Israeli war on the Strip, which has left approximately 180,000 dead or injured and over 11,000 missing, clearly demonstrates this approach, aimed at weakening Palestinian society by fostering internal chaos. Supporting armed gangs appears to be part of a deliberate strategy to deepen the humanitarian crisis and destabilize social cohesion, posing a formidable challenge to rebuilding Gaza’s social fabric in the future.

Dangerous Repercussions: Security Chaos and the Fate of Hostages

The policy of arming gangs raises fears of escalating security chaos, particularly with warnings from Israeli sources that the proliferation of these militias could complicate negotiations to release Israeli hostages held by Hamas. The hostages’ retention under the control of Hamas’s military wing provides Israel with a clear negotiating counterpart, but the disintegration of this control could scatter the hostages among unknown militias, making negotiations more difficult. Meanwhile, some Israeli sources see the success of these gangs in Rafah as a potential springboard for expanding the experiment to other areas, aiming to establish an “alternative government” to the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, though this ambition faces fierce Palestinian resistance.

Israel’s strategy of arming gangs in Gaza, despite its aim to weaken Hamas, carries grave risks. The profound societal rejection of collaboration with the occupation, coupled with the possibility of the resistance seizing these gangs’ weapons, diminishes their chances of success. Furthermore, these groups contribute to destroying the social fabric by spreading chaos and violence, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis amid an ongoing Israeli siege. Historical experiments suggest that achieving Israel’s goals will be difficult, leaving the question: Will this policy lead to stability under Israeli control, or will it plunge Gaza into further chaos? The root solution lies in addressing the causes of the conflict rather than fueling it.